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INTRODUCTION 1
Donald McGahn is a respected member of the Washington D.C.
legal community, known especially for his expertise in election law.
He served as White House counsel in the Trump administration
until October 2018 and was a key player in the Trump administration’s judicial appointments process.2 His article is witty, sometimes
revealing, but above all a description, as he sees it, of the decadeslong deterioration of the process for Senate confirmation of federal
judicial nominees, with some blame assigning.3 He also provides a
few behind-the-scenes looks at Trump administration confirmation
battles, and some recommendations for easing contentiousness in—
or at least, speeding up—the process. While he does not hide his

1. Data for this Article come primarily from my own data sets on federal judicial
nominations and appointments from the Reagan administration through the present. In
building the data sets, and researching for this Article, I drew on publicly available data from
the Congressional Record; the Library of Congress’s presidential nominations website; the
Federal Judicial Center’s Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges (including the
downloadable Excel spreadsheet, which contains information not displayed at the link
embedded in the following citation); vacancy data from a website maintained by the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts; and U.S. Senate party control as tracked on a United
States Senate website. See Nominations, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/search?q=
{%22source%22:%22nominations%22}&searchResultViewType=expanded&KWICView=false
[https://perma.cc/PR8V-DT3H] (conducting an advanced search by staying within the category
of “nominations” from the 97th-116th Congress (1981-2020)) [hereinafter Nominations];
Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 1789-Present, FED . JUD . CTR., https://
www.fjc.gov/history/judges [https://perma.cc/7XTV-LJFA] [hereinafter Biographical Directory
of Art. III Federal Judges]; Judicial Vacancies, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/ judgesjudgeships/judicial-vacancies [https://perma.cc/9QWF-TP89] (tracking current and future
judicial vacancies) [hereinafter Judicial Vacancies]; Party Division, U.S. SENATE, https://www.
senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm [https://perma.cc/P2NS-EFZ8] (analyzing Senate party
control over the period in question) [hereinafter Party Division, Senate].
2. See, e.g., Joel Achenbach, A Look at the List Helping Trump Reshape the Supreme
Court, CHICAGO TRIB. (July 7, 2018), https://www.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/ct-trumpsupreme-court-list-20180708-story.html [https://perma.cc/U375-WKQV] (describing McGahn’s
importance to the Trump administration’s judicial appointment process).
3. See e.g., Donald F. McGahn II, A Brief History of Judicial Appointments from the Last
50 Years Through the Trump Administration, 60 WM . & MARY L. REV. ONLINE 105, 122-24
(2019) (contrasting how there were not any “personal assaults” during the nomination process
for Elena Kagan, and arguing that the concurrent use of the “so-called nuclear option” by
Senate Democrats made the process “more and more contentious” whereas the Garland
nomination did not result in any “personal attacks on Garland” due to the credit of the Senate
Republicans).
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Republican leanings—e.g., “President Carter made no Supreme
Court appointments ... thankfully”4—this is in no way a slash-andburn propaganda piece.
His article stands for two propositions—first, the process has
deteriorated and, second, although, there is blame to go around,
Democrats deserve more of it than Republicans.5 The article also
vindicates the always timely aphorism that the plural of “anecdote”
is not “data.” McGahn argues primarily from example. Those he
cites are illustrative and help flesh out his arguments, but they are
less dispositive than they might appear on first blush. Of course,
examples are one staple of most any argument—this commentary
included—but McGahn relies on them largely to the exclusion of
aggregate data.
To be sure, the article is a lightly edited revision of a conversational law school lecture and does not purport to be an academic
article weighed down by dense scholarly apparatus.6 That in some
ways is one of its virtues. But even an informal narrative can seek
various types of data to illuminate its subject—or acknowledge the
limitations of the examples it uses.
In Part I of this commentary, I summarize the judicial appointment developments of the last forty or fifty years more fully than
does McGahn; in Part II, I unpack what might be charitably called
creative history by McGahn and other defenders of the Senate’s
shutting down the 2016 Merrick Garland Supreme Court nomination; in Part III, I consider McGahn’s and others’ proposals to help
change the nomination and confirmation process; and in Part IV, I
summarize briefly what appear to be underlying causes of that
broken process and possible consequences of a judiciary populated
in no small part by judges who gained office with a minimal popular
mandate for their selection.
I. A PROCESS IN “SIGNIFICANT DECLINE ”
Few would dispute that the process of filling federal judicial
vacancies is, as McGahn puts it, “in significant decline ... a mess,
4. Id. at 107.
5. Id. at 122-25, 134.
6. Id. at 105 n. 1.
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and ... the mess has spread.”7 In fact, McGahn could have made this
claim of decline even stronger by mining information embraced by
his title’s time span. “[T]he last 50 years” suggests an examination
of confirmation politics since 1969, the first year of the Richard M.
Nixon administration.8 Nixon, though, makes only a cameo appearance,9 even though confirmation patterns under Nixon and his
immediate predecessor, Lyndon B. Johnson, are instructive. Both
presidents’ terms were more than tumultuous—both were forced
from office, one by the threat of electoral defeat, the other by the
certainty of legislative removal.10 Nevertheless, as seen in Table 1,
their judicial appointment successes—measured by confirmation
rates around ninety percent, and median days from nomination to
confirmation in the teens and twenties—suggest a different planet
from the one on which we now seat federal judges.11 Compare the
Johnson and Nixon data in Table 1 with those of presidents Reagan
through Trump, shown in Table 2.12

7. Id. at 108.
8. Id. at 105 (referencing the title of the piece by Donald F. McGahn II to which this
commentary is a response).
9. See id. at 107 (noting Nixon’s various judicial appointments).
10. See, e.g., Clay Risen, The Unmaking of the President, SMITHSONIAN MAG . (Apr. 2008),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-unmaking-of-the-president-31577203/ [https://
perma.cc/5U3G-7SJC] (examining the reasons for Johnson’s decision not to run for re-election,
including that “his political capital was gone”); see also Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Resigns,
WASH . POST, Aug. 9, 1974, at A01, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/
watergate/articles/080974-3.htm [https://perma.cc/LQJ9-7KNQ] (explaining that Nixon’s resignation was expected by many a few days before it was announced, given that “his support
on Capitol Hill was disappearing at dizzying speed” and additionally, “[t]here were demands
from some of his staunchest supporters that he should resign at once”).
11. Confirmation rate data is from Congressional Research Service, Judicial Nomination
Statistics, 1945-76 (RL 32122). Median days were calculated from the Federal Judicial Center
data base. See Biographical Directory of Art. III Federal Judges, supra note 1.
12. See infra note 13 and accompanying text (referring to Table 1).
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Table 1. Median Days, Nomination to Confirmation, and
Percent of Nominations Confirmed During Johnson and Nixon
Presidencies13
District Judges
Johnson
Nixon

Circuit Judges

Median days

Rate

Median days

Rate

24
17

91%
99%

26
17

93%
94%

Going further back—from mid- to early twentieth century—reveals
not simply a different planet, but a different universe. Republican
President Warren Harding nominated former Republican president
William Howard Taft to be Chief Justice on June 30, 1921.14 The
Senate confirmed him the same day, by a voice vote 15—at a time of
vigorous Progressive opposition to federal courts’ invalidating social
and economic legislation. (To illustrate the difference, imagine a
President Hillary Clinton nominating former President Barack
Obama to become a justice; no one would dream of a voice-vote
confirmation, or any confirmation short of a lengthy knock-down,
drag-out battle.)
II. WHOM TO BLAME?
Much of the blather about the current state of the confirmation
looks for villains. The refrain most frequently heard is that the
fight over Robert Bork’s 1987 Supreme Court nomination effected
a basic change.16 Wyoming Senator John Barrasso wheeled out
that chestnut in a 2016 floor speech: “undermining the way [judicial] appointments used to be made.... started in 1987, when Senate
Democrats launched an all-out assault against the [Supreme Court]
13. Russell Wheeler, Data Sets of Presidential Judicial Nominees (unpublished) (on file
with author). The author’s data sets are drawn from publicly available sources. See, e.g.,
Nominations, supra note 1; Biographical Directory of Art III. Federal Judges, supra note 1;
Judicial Vacancies, supra note 1; Party Division, Senate, supra note 1.
14. Supreme Court Nominations (Present-1789), U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/
legislative/nominations/SupremeCourtNominations1789present.htm [https://perma.cc/G5KNL92F].
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., McGahn, supra note 3, at 113 ( “Some of the recent confirmation antics may
seem normal, but in 1987 this was a new program.”).
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nomination of Judge Robert Bork.”17 That claim ignores, just as to
the Supreme Court, the bitter 1916 Brandeis confirmation (including a strain of anti-Semitism),18 the gauntlets through which
Southern Democrats ran some of President Eisenhower’s nominees after Brown v. Board of Education (1954), and those same interests’ efforts to derail, or at least embarrass, President Johnson’s
Supreme Court nominee, Thurgood Marshall.19 The Senate refused
to confirm two of Johnson’s and two of President Nixon’s Supreme
Court nominees.20 I submit later that at bottom the confirmation
mess is not a continuing tit-for-tat that began with the Bork fiasco, but rather a manifestation of the polarization that has infected
our politics generally over approximately the last fifty years. But
granting that does not negate the value of nailing down how the
“mess” evolved.
A. Did “Things Change” During the George W. Bush Presidency?
McGahn holds neither side blameless for today’s “mess,” but he
puts most of the onus on Democrats. He recounts relatively benign
examples of noncontentious confirmations in the Carter administration—four confirmations to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit (CA-DC) that moved in two to three
months and similar examples in the Reagan and Clinton administrations,21 as well as the now jaw-dropping 98-0 vote to confirm
Reagan nominee Antonin Scalia to the Supreme Court.22
The article then traces the contentious fights over the Bork and
Clarence Thomas Supreme Court nominations, compared to the
near unanimous confirmations of Clinton’s Ruth Bader Ginsburg
and Stephen Breyer Supreme Court nominations, and similarly easy
17. News Release, John Barrasso, Barrasso: Democrats Created Precedent for Supreme
Court Nominations (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.barrasso.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2016/3/
barrasso-democrats-created-precedent-for-supreme-court-nominations [https://perma.cc/TJ3E7JE3].
18. See ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON , BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN ’S LIFE 465-508 (1946)
(suggesting the role of Brandeis’s religion at pages 481, 491, and 507).
19. See BENJAMIN WITTES, CONFIRMATION WARS: PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN
ANGRY TIMES 65-76 (2006).
20. See Supreme Court Nominations (Present-1789), supra note 14.
21. See McGahn, supra note 3, at 105, 108-09, 111, 118.
22. See id. at 112.
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confirmations of the three judges the Senate let Clinton appoint to
CA-DC.23 The lecture then “[f]ast-forward[s] to President George W.
Bush [and] suggest[s] that this is where things really seemed to
really change.”24 McGahn bolsters this claim by comparing the oneand two-year confirmation fights over Clinton and W. Bush CA-DC
nominees, especially John G. Roberts, Jr.25 Roberts’s 2001 nomination was pending when Vermont Senator James Jeffords switched
parties, giving Democrats a majority.26 “After two years,” the lecture
continues, Roberts “was confirmed by voice vote” on May 8, 2003.27
McGahn’s implied—and legitimate—question: what else explains
the delay other than a change in party control of the Senate?28
There is a back story, however. Roberts’s 2003 confirmation filled
a vacancy created by Judge James Buckley’s 1996 retirement. But
the first nominee to fill that vacancy was not Roberts but rather
Elena Kagan.29 Clinton sent her name to the Senate in June 1999,
but the lame-duck 1999-2000 Republican Senate refused to give her
a Judiciary Committee hearing or a vote.30 And Kagan was wellqualified—McGahn said of her 2010 Supreme Court nomination, “no
one could criticize her abilities as a legal mind. She was impeccably
qualified.”31 In sum, a nominee as superbly well-qualified as John
Roberts deserved a speedy confirmation vote, but Democrats denied
it.32 By the same token, a nominee as equally well-qualified as Elena
Kagan also deserved a speedy confirmation vote, but Republicans
denied her any vote—speedy or otherwise.33 (Overall, the Senate

23. See id. at 113-18.
24. Id. at 118.
25. See id. at 118-19.
26. See id.
27. Id. at 119.
28. Id. at 118-20.
29. Bill Mears, Papers Show Kagan’s Effort to Get Hearing on Appeals Court Nomination,
CNN (June 11, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/06/11/scotus.kagan.first.nomina
tion/index.html [https://perma.cc/4Y4B-YNHU].
30. See id.
31. McGahn, supra note 3, at 122.
32. Marc A. Thiessen, How Biden Killed John Roberts’s Nomination in 1992, WASH . POST
(Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-biden-killed-john-robertssnomination-in-92/2016/02/25/c17841be-dbdf-11e5-81ae-7491b9b9e7df_story.html [https://
perma.cc/74VW-YW3K].
33. See Mears, supra note 29.
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confirmed three of Clinton’s five CA-DC nominees and four of W.
Bush’s six.34).
Of course, had McGahn taken note of Kagan’s failed June 1999
nomination, he might also have noted Roberts’s failed January 1992
nomination to the CA-DC seat that Clarence Thomas vacated.35 Late
term nominations, almost by definition, have a harder row. Still, the
Democratic Senate confirmed twelve of the nineteen circuit nominees that Reagan submitted in June 1987 or later, but of the
twenty circuit nominees (including Kagan) that Clinton submitted
in June 1999 or later, the Senate confirmed only seven.36
B. When Did the Court of Appeals Confirmation Rate Start to
Decline?
So, examples pull both ways, but aggregate data are often more
illuminating. Indeed, the article’s near-exclusive reliance on CA-DC
as a surrogate for confirmation politics nationwide has its plusses
and minuses. It is, of course, a highly visible court given the outsized share of blockbuster cases that come to it as a result of its
location (“some call [it] the second most important court ... a court
of unique emphasis.”37) CA-DC is also, as the article notes, an object
of perennial debate over whether it has an oversupply of judgeships—how to weigh CA-DC’s small case-per-judgeship ratio (94
versus an all-circuit median of 284 in statistical year 201838) against
its heavier than average proportion of administrative agency appeals? (Such appeals were 17 percent of the court’s filings in 2018
versus 12 percent nationally.39 And 85 percent of agency appeals
nationally in 2018 came from the Board of Immigration Appeals.40
34. Russell Wheeler, Data Sets (Feb. 28, 2020) (unpublished) (on file with author).
35. See, e.g., Thiessen, supra note 32.
36. Wheeler, supra note 34.
37. McGahn, supra note 3, at 109.
38. See Table B, U.S. Courts of Appeals, U.S. CRTS. (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.uscourts.
gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b_0930.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/PH29-9J2Q].
39. See Table B-1, U.S. Courts of Appeals, U.S. CRTS. (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.us
courts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b1_0930.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/V62F-A8TJ].
40. See Table B-3-U.S. Courts of Appeals Judicial Business, U.S. CRTS. (Sept. 30, 2018),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b3_0930.2018.pdf [http://perma.
cc/LK66-TV2T] (reporting that out of the 6089 administrative agency appeals filed nationally in the 2018 statistical year, 5158 were from the BIA).
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BIA appeals are generally much less complicated than CA-DC’s
agency appeals, which include none from the BIA.41 Moreover, CADC appointees are often from outside the circuit, creating a different
nomination and confirmation dynamic. So, the appellate court on
which McGahn focuses much of his analysis is not a microcosm of
the federal appellate judiciary.
Stepping away from that single court, what do national data tell
us about changes in confirmation dynamics under recent presidents?
Table 2 shows the confirmation rate and median days—nomination-to-confirmation for nominees to all thirteen courts of appeals,
starting with Reagan.42 For Reagan and other two-term presidents,
Table 2 also shows the separate records for the first and second four
years.43 To keep things relatively simple, the table doesn’t control
for periods of unified versus divided government.

41. See id.
42. See infra note 44 and accompanying text (referring to Table 2).
43. See infra note 44 and accompanying text (referring to Table 2).
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Table 2. Nominations, Confirmations, Confirmation Rate, and
Nomination-to-Confirmation Median Days, Reagan to Trump, All
Courts of Appeals44
Full Term
First Four Years Second Four Years
Rate
Days
Rate
Days
Rate
Days
Reagan (81-88) 83/94 88% 45
38/40 95% 28 48/55
87% 61
Bush (89-92)
42/532 79% 83
Clinton (93-00)* 66/89 74% 139 36/39 92% 111 30/50
60% 175
Bush (01-08)
60/84 71% 219 41/50 82% 260 18/338 55% 144
Obama (09-16)
55/68 81% 229 36/42 86% 248 19/26
73% 218
Trump (17-20)** 53/55 96% 136
* Counts Roger Gregory (CA-4) as Clinton, not W. Bush appointee.
** Through mid-July 2020.

Viewing only the “Full Term” column, it might appear that the
degradation of the process began, not with George W. Bush, as
McGahn asserts, but with his father.45 Over his eight years, Reagan
got 88 percent of his ninety-four circuit nominees confirmed, and in
median days of forty-five.46 For the first Bush, the confirmation rate
dropped by nine percentage points and median days for confirmation almost doubled.47 But that is mainly because late in 1990,
Congress enacted an omnibus (nationwide) judgeship-creation
statute (Congress has enacted none such statutes since).48 The 1990
statute immediately added eleven circuit vacancies to the seven
then in place, and seventy-four additional district vacancies to the

44. Compare Russell Wheeler, Ronald Reagan (RR) Dist. and RR CA Data Sets
(unpublished) (on file with author), and Russell Wheeler, Bush 1 Dist. and Bush 1 CA Data
Sets (unpublished) (on file with author), and Russell Wheeler, William J. Clinton (WJC) Dist.
and WJC CA Data Sets (unpublished) (on file with author), and Russell Wheeler, George W.
Bush (GWB) Dist. Nominees and Summary and GWB CA Nominees and Summary
(unpublished) (on file with author), with Russell Wheeler, Barack H. Obama (BHO) CA
nominees and BHO DIST nominees Data Sets (unpublished) (on file with author), and Russell
Wheeler, Donald J. Trump Dist. nominees and Trump CA nominees Data Sets (unpublished)
(on file with author). The author’s data sets are drawn from publicly available sources. See,
e.g., Nominations, supra note 1; Biographical Directory of Art III. Federal Judges, supra note
1; Judicial Vacancies, supra note 1; Party Division, Senate, supra note 1.
45. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (citing information in Table 2).
46. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (citing information in Table 2).
47. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (citing information in Table 2).
48. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089.
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twenty-eight then in place.49 To fill these vacancies and the additional vacancies created in 1991 and 1992 by judges leaving active
status, Bush submitted many more nominees in his second two
years, as Table 3 shows.50
Table 3. Nominations and Confirmations in H.W. Bush’s
First and Second Two Years51

Court of Appeals
District Courts

1989-90
Nominated
Confirmed

1991-92
Nominated
Confirmed

23
51

30
140

22
50

(96%)
(98%)

20
99

(66%)
(71%)

The Senate, controlled by Democrats, increased the number of
confirmations, but the district confirmation rates still fell from
ninety-eight percent in the first two years to seventy-one percent in
the second and, for circuit nominees, from ninety-six percent to
sixty-six percent.52(As noted, John Roberts was one of ten 1991-92
circuit nominees whom the Senate did not confirm).53 The drop is
explained in part by the glut of nominees but also by Democrats’
saving vacancies in anticipation of the 1992 presidential election.
Accordingly, George H.W. Bush’s record is something of an
aberration. In normal times, we might have expected the H.W. Bush
circuit confirmation patterns to more or less follow those of Reagan.
Thus, the drop for Clinton, down to 74 percent confirmed circuit
nominees, suggests that it was with Clinton that “things,” to use
McGahn’s words, “really seemed to really change.”54 In fact, the real
change came in Clinton’s second term. Confirmation rates in his
first term were 92 percent, with median days of 111.55 The rate
49. See id. §§ 202-203, 104 Stat. 5098-5100.
50. See infra note 51 and accompanying text (citing information found in Table 3).
51. See Wheeler, supra note 44. The author’s data sets are drawn from publicly available
sources. See, e.g., Nominations, supra note 1; Biographical Directory of Art III. Federal
Judges, supra note 1; Judicial Vacancies, supra note 1; Party Division, Senate, supra note 1.
52. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (citing information in Table 2).
53. See Wheeler, Bush 1 CA Data Set, supra note 44; supra note 51 and accompanying
text (citing to Table 3).
54. McGahn, supra note 3, at 118; supra note 44 and accompanying text (citing to Table
2).
55. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (citing to Table 2).
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dropped to 60 percent in his second term, and the time to achieve
those confirmations jumped to 175 median days.56 Confirmation
rates generally decline in a two-term president’s second term, but
of the four shown in Table 2, the decline in Clinton’s second term
was the sharpest.57 Digging deeper into aggregate data reminds us,
as Einstein reportedly said, “Everything should be made as simple
as possible, but no simpler.”58
Table 2 suggests that, starting with Clinton’s second term
experience, things have gone downhill more or less steadily, at least
for those who believe that judicial confirmations should be relatively
routine and expeditious, as once they were.59 Clinton’s two Supreme
Court nominees—both confirmed in his first two years—got only
token opposition, but Bush’s two nominees—Roberts and Alito—got
twenty-two and forty-two negative votes respectively, and Obama’s
two got thirty-one and thirty-seven.60
W. Bush’s circuit nominees were confirmed at a lower rate than
Clinton’s and took longer.61 Senate Democrats denied some Bush
nominees votes for reasons unrelated to the needs of the appellate
judiciary.62 The best example, which McGahn describes more benignly than one might expect,63 was the treatment of CA-DC nominee Miguel Estrada—what my colleague Benjamin Wittes called
“fight[ing] dirty.”64 Democrats opposed Estrada largely on pretext.65
In fact, they feared that a place on CA-DC could be a launching pad
for the first Hispanic Supreme Court Justice.66
56. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (citing to Table 2).
57. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (citing to Table 2).
58. In Honor of Albert Einstein’s Birthday-Everything Should Be Made as Simple as
Possible, But No Simpler, CHAMPIONING SCI., https://championingscience.com/2019/03/15/ev
erything-should-be-made-as-simple-as-possible-but-no-simpler/ [https://perma.cc/CC7Z-43QT].
59. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (citing information in Table 2).
60. See McGahn, supra note 3, at 117, 120-22.
61. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (citing information in Table 2). Compare
Wheeler, GWB CA Nominees and Summary Data Set, supra note 44, with Wheeler, WJC CA
Data Set, supra note 44. The author’s data sets are drawn from publicly available sources.
See, e.g., Nominations, supra note 1; Biographical Directory of Art III. Federal Judges, supra
note 1; Judicial Vacancies, supra note 1; Party Division, Senate, supra note 1.
62. See McGahn, supra note 3, at 119.
63. See id.
64. BENJAMIN WITTES, CONFIRMATION WARS: PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN AN GRY TIMES 44 (2006).
65. See McGahn, supra note 3, at 119.
66. See id.
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Table 2 shows that Obama’s appointees took even longer to
confirm.67 Their confirmation rate was slightly higher, but Obama
submitted fewer nominees than his previous two predecessors.68
One reason, we can surmise, is that home-state Republican senators wielded their “ blue-slip veto” vigorously, making nominations
pointless. For at least the last half-century, home-state senators
of either party could effectively kill a nomination to a judgeship
in that state by using the Senate Judiciary Committee Chair’s bluepaper inquiry to indicate disapproval of the nominee.69 The threat
of a negative blue-slip encouraged White House-home-state senator
bargaining.70 Obama, for a vivid example, submitted no nominees
for two Texas-based CA-5 vacancies announced in February 2012
(Emilio Garza) and October 2013 (Carolyn King).71 One can be fairly
sure it was because the two Texas senators declined to approve any
nominee Obama would propose, not because Obama did not want to
change the party-of-appointing-President balance on that very conservative court.
C. The Increase Under Trump of Confirmation Rates and Speedier
Court of Appeals Confirmation Times
Table 2 shows that Trump’s circuit appointees have moved to
confirmation much more quickly than did those of his two immediate predecessors.72 That is partly because the Democratic Senate

67. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (citing information in Table 2).
68. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (citing information in Table 2).
69. See, e.g., BARRY J. MCMILLION , CONG . RESEARCH SERV., R44975, THE BLUE SLIP
PROCESS FOR U.S. CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT NOMINATIONS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
8 (2017).
70. See Laila Robbins, Blue Slip Blues: 5 Corrections to the Ongoing Debate, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/
blue-slip-blues-5-corrections-ongoing-debate [https://perma.cc/A8BE-5Y6P] (explaining that
the blue slip practice was “established to ensure the White House consulted with home state
senators in selecting nominees”).
71. Cf. Ian Millhiser, What Trump Has Done to the Courts, Explained, VOX (Feb. 4, 2020,
6:58 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/12/9/20962980/trump-supreme-courtfederal-judges [https://perma.cc/C99G-6V9N] (“Obama ‘did not even make a nomination’ to
two seats on the Fifth Circuit because the blue slip would have doomed anyone he named.”).
72. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (citing information in Table 2).
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abolished the filibuster for non-Supreme Court nominees in November 2013.73 (McGahn suggests that may have been an unwise
“tactical move,”74 but Republicans probably would have done the
same thing once they gained control of the White House and the
Senate.) Quicker Trump circuit confirmations are also due partly
to the Republican Senate leadership’s abolishing the blue-slip
veto for circuit nominees in 2017.75 Senator Patrick Leahy, as Judiciary Committee Chair from 2001-2003 and 2007-2015,76 honored
it institutionally and religiously—some Democrats say naively.77
The confirmation rate also reflects the admirable bulldozer efficiency with which McGahn and Senate allies pushed through circuit nominees.
Despite the administration’s relative success in getting circuit
judges in place, McGahn notes correctly the high number of negative
votes those nominees have garnered—he gives the example of fortyeight “no” votes for Trump’s well-qualified CA-DC appointee Greg
Katsas.78 Consulting aggregate data would have bolstered the point.
Table 4 shows that opposition senators mustered over forty no votes
for about a tenth of Bush’s and Obama’s circuit appointees, but did
so for more than two-thirds of Trump’s appointees.79 (Negative votes
almost never exceed fifty—nominees almost never lose a floor vote.80
Those who might almost never get one.81 Bork was an exception, as
was Ronnie White, a Clinton district nominee from Missouri who
lost a floor vote in October 1999—the most recent such loss—but
was confirmed after his 2014 renomination.82)
73. See Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear’ Option; Eliminate Most Filibusters
on Nominees, WASH . POST (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senatepoised-to-limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent/2013/
11/21/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html [https://perma.cc/G5NE-CLVM].
74. McGahn, supra note 3, at 124.
75. See Joseph P. Williams, McConnell to End Senate’s ‘Blue Slip’ Tradition, U.S. NEWS
(Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2017-10-11/mcconnell-to-endsenates-blue-slip-tradition [https://perma.cc/97L4-MX7R].
76. See Previous Committee Chairmen, U.S. SENATE: COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/about/chairman/previous [https://perma.cc/J24T-KPHU].
77. See McGahn, supra note 3, at 127.
78. See id. at 105-10.
79. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., infra note 83 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., infra note 83 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., Wheeler, supra note 13. The author’s data sets are drawn from publicly
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Table 4. “No” Votes for Court of Appeals Nominees, W. Bush
Through Trump83
“No” votes
W. Bush (N=60)* Obama (N=55)
Trump (N=53)**
50
0
0
1
40-49
6
6
35
30-39
5
4
5
20-29
3
3
5
Less than 20
46
42
7
* Excludes Roger Gregory, whom Clinton put in office by a January 2000 recess
appointment. (Bush renominated him on the advice of Virginia’s two Republican
senators.84 )
** Through mid-July 2020 .

McGahn expresses some surprise at the Trump circuit nominees’
relatively high number of “no” votes compared to circuit nominees
of previous presidents.85 And, as to the Supreme Court, after noting
the thirty-one and thirty-seven “no” votes for Justices Sotomayor
and Kagan,86 McGahn finds the 45 votes against Justice Gorsuch
to be “amazing.”87
That characterization must have been a bit tongue-in-cheek. The
votes against Gorsuch, well-credentialed as he is, obviously reflected
anger over Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s refusal to let
the Senate even consider, much less vote on, Obama’s March 2016

available sources. See, e.g., Nominations, supra note 1; Biographical Directory of Art III.
Federal Judges, supra note 1; Judicial Vacancies, supra note 1; Party Division, Senate, supra
note 1.
83. Compare Wheeler, GWB Dist. Nominees and Summary and GWB CA Nominees and
Summary Data Sets, supra note 44, with Wheeler, BHO CA Nominees and BHO Dist.
Nominees, supra note 44, and Wheeler, Trump Dist. Nominees and Trump CA Nominees,
supra note 44. The author’s data sets are drawn from publicly available sources. See, e.g.,
Nominations, supra note 1; Biographical Directory of Art III. Federal Judges, supra note 1;
Judicial Vacancies, supra note 1; Party Division, Senate, supra note 1.
84. Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments: Hearings before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, a U.S. Senator from the
State of Vermont) (explaining that “with the continued strong support of Senator Warner and
Senator Allen,” who were the two Senators from Virginia, “President Bush re-nominated
Judge Gregory”).
85. See McGahn, supra note 3, at 110-11.
86. See id. at 121.
87. Id. at 122, 125.
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nomination of CA-DC Chief Judge Merrick Garland to fill the vacancy created by Justice Scalia’s death a month earlier.88
III. WAS “GARLAND 1.0” CONSISTENT WITH “LONG-STANDING
TRADITION?”
McGahn argues that not processing Garland’s nomination was
justified because “it had been over a hundred years since a Supreme
Court Justice was confirmed in an election year, which is a fact”—
except that it is not.89 Table 5 makes clear that it is not: there were
four election-year appointments in three election years from 1916
to 1956.90 McGahn’s source, a 2019 Orrin Hatch article, stated “[i]t
had been 100 years since a Supreme court nominee had been
confirmed in a presidential election year after voting in the election
had started” (emphasis added).91 The italicized qualifier probably
tries to distinguish confirmations in the early twentieth century
from those in the modern era of year-long presidential primary
seasons—a distinction without a real difference.92
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell made an even bolder
claim. According to news reports, in 2019 “McConnell was asked by
an attendee during a speech ... in Kentucky what his position would
be on filling a Supreme Court seat during 2020 if a Justice died. ‘Oh,
we'd fill it,’ McConnell said to laughter from the audience.”93 In a
2016 interview, he referred to “a longstanding tradition of not filling
vacancies on the Supreme Court in the middle of a presidential
election year.”94 On several occasions he said, “You have to go back
to 1880 to find the last time ... a Senate of a different party from the
88. See McGahn, supra note 3, at 118.
89. Id. at 122-23.
90. See id. at 123; see infra note 97 and accompanying text (referring to Table 5).
91. Orrin G. Hatch, The Descent of Advice and Consent: Perspectives from a 42-Year Tour
of Duty 2,HERITAGE FOUND . (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/201901/HL1303.pdf [https://perma.cc/3RKQ-D2ZW].
92. See id.
93. Jordain Carney, McConnell Says Republicans Would Fill 2020 Supreme Court Vacancy, THE HILL (May 28, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/445866-mcconnellsenate-gop-would-fill-2020-supreme-court-vacancy [https://perma.cc/YY2F-3EAF].
94. Amy Sherman, What Mitch McConnell Said About Supreme Court Confirmations in
Election Years, POLITIFACT (July 2, 2018), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/
2018/jul/02/what-mitch-mcconnell-said-about-supreme-court-conf/ [https://perma.cc/NJ28SAFW].
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president filled a Supreme Court vacancy created in the middle of
a presidential election.”95 McConnell’s “long-standing tradition”
formulation leaves the inference that Supreme Court vacancies have
been a regular occurrence in presidential election years, but that
presidents and Senates have eschewed filling these vacancies in
deference to some unwritten but hoary presumption against acting
on Supreme Court nominations in those years. Table 5 provides a
clearer picture: at least since the late nineteenth century,
presidential-election-year vacancies have been rare, but when they
occurred, most often for health reasons, the Senate and President
almost always filled them promptly and with little rancor, contrary
to what one would expect if “a long-standing tradition” were on the
line.96 Table 5 also shows, to paraphrase McConnell, you have to go
back to 1888 to find the last time that a different party than the
president’s controlled the Senate when a vacancy occurred during
an election year.

95. Jordain Carney, McConnell: GOP Would ‘absolutely’ Fill Supreme Court Seat Next
Year, THE HILL (Sept. 3, 2019, 11:01 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/459715-mccon
nell-gop-would-absolutely-fill-supreme-court-seat-next-year [https://perma.cc/2622-HHGW].
96. See infra note 97 and accompanying text (citing information in Table 5).
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Table 5. Post-Civil War Supreme Court Vacancies in Place
During Presidential Election Years—Cause, Nomination and
Confirmation Dates, Confirmation Vote, Unified or Divided White
House-Senate Party Control97

Vacancy*

Date

Cause

Nominee &
Conf. Date
Date

Vote

WHSenate
Party
Control

Lamar, L.
1/16/88
32-28
D 39-37
12/6/87
Fuller
Waite
3/23/88 Death
7/20/88
41-20
D 39-37
4/30/88
Shiras
Bradley
1/22/92 Death
7/26/92
Voice
U 47-39-2
7/19/92
Pitney
Harlan
10/14/11 Death
3/13/12
50-26
U 52-44
2/19/12
Brandeis
Lamar, Jr. 1/2/16
Death
6/1/16
47-22
U 56-40
1/28/16
Pres.
Clarke
Hughes
6/10/16
7/24/16
Voice
U 56-40
Cand.
7/14/16
Cardozo
Holmes
1/12/32 Health
2/24/32
Voice
U 48-47-1
2/15/32
Brennan
Recess
Minton
10/15/56 Health
10/15/56
U 48-47-1
10/15/56
App.
Fortas
Warren**
None
None
U 64-36
6/28/68
Thornberry
Fortas**
None
None
Same
(same)
Garland
Scalia
2/13/16 Death
None
None
D 54-44
3/16/16
* Excludes 1872 and 1880 vacancies created by deaths that occurred after election
day.
** See text.
Woods

5/14/87 Death

Table 5 shows, for example, that Justice William Woods died on
May 14, 1887.98 To succeed him, Democratic President Grover
97. See, e.g., Party Division, supra note 1; Supreme Court Nominations (Present-1789),
U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/nominations/SupremeCourtNominations1789
present.htm [https://perma.cc/G5KN-L92F].
98. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (citing information in Table 5); Woods,
William Burnham, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/woods-william-burnham
[https://perma.cc/3UUN-WT68].
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Cleveland nominated Lucius Lamar—a former Confederate officer
and office holder—on December 6, 1887, and the Republican-controlled Senate confirmed him by a 32-28 vote on January 16, 1888.99
Unpacking McConnell’s claim, note first that Supreme Court
vacancies rarely occur in election years, probably because justices
want to avoid election-year skirmishes over their replacements. For
whatever reason, since the Civil War the only vacancies in place in
presidential election years are those in Table 5.100 Until the 1960s
and beyond, death or poor health accounted for all such vacancies
except for Charles Evans Hughes’s 1916 resignation to run for
president.101 (In 1968, technically there were no vacancies because
Chief Justice Warren, in an somewhat unseemly power play to try
to deny would-be President Nixon an appointment, essentially
conditioned his retirement on the confirmation of his successor.)102
President Johnson withdrew his nominations of Justice Abe Fortas
as Chief Justice and Fifth Circuit Judge Homer Thornberry to
replace Fortas after it seemed likely that the Democratic Senate
would reject the nominations.103
Furthermore, most of the election-year confirmations did in fact
occur, as McConnell said, during unified White House-Senate party
control.104 Nevertheless, were McConnell’s conjured-up venerable
tradition a fact, one would expect strong minority party votes
against the nominee to protest the tradition’s violation. Yet three
of the vacancies were filled by voice vote.105 In 1892, with the soonto-be-defeated Benjamin Harrison in the White House, forty-one
opposition senators participated in a voice vote to confirm George
Shiras to replace the deceased Joseph Bradley.106 In 1932, the
99. See Lamar, Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus, FED . JUD . CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/
judges/lamar-lucius-quintus-cincinnatus [https://perma.cc/RN57-3YXP].
100. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (citing information in Table 5).
101. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (citing to Table 5).
102. Anthony Lewis, Warren Firm on Retiring; Leaves Date Up to Nixon, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
15, 1968, at 1.
103. See id. at 1, 33; Unsuccessful Nominations and Recess Appointments, FED . JUD . CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/unsuccessful-nominations-and-recess-appointments [https://
perma.cc/Q22F-RX58].
104. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (citing to Table 5).
105. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (citing to Table 5).
106. Scott Bomboy, Why the Current Supreme Court Nomination Situation Isn’t That
Unique, NAT’L CONST. CTR., (Feb. 14, 2016), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/why-thecurrent-supreme-court-nomination-situation-isnt-that-unique/ [https://perma.cc/JR4X-TZR4].
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Senate was essentially equally divided when it approved by voice
vote the unpopular Herbert Hoover’s nomination of Benjamin Cardozo to replace the ailing Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.107
Furthermore, when there were roll-call votes, the minority party
was never unified in opposition; that is, not all minority party
senators voted against the nominations, hardly what one would
expect were there really a “long-standing tradition” against such
nominations.108
With McConnell’s fabricated history and cavalier promise to fill
any 2020 vacancy—the Garland precedent notwithstanding—no
wonder cynicism surrounds the process.
A. Why the Contentiousness over Trump’s Court of Appeals
Nominees—“Garland 2.0?”
The same anger that explains Democratic senators’ no votes
against Justice Gorsuch helps explain the “no” votes against
Trump’s circuit nominees (that and the outsized role granted the
Federalist Society and other conservative legal groups in vetting
candidates).109 Republicans, once they gained a Senate majority in
2015, confirmed only two of Obama’s circuit nominees— obstructionism that might be labelled “Merrick Garland 2.0.”110 By contrast,
opposition-party Senates in the final two (lame-duck) years of the
Reagan, Clinton, and George W. Bush administration, confirmed
seventeen, sixteen, and ten circuit judges, respectively.111

107. Bridget Flynn, On this Day in Supreme Court History—February 15, 1932: Benjamin
Cardozo Nominated to the Supreme Court, ISCOTUS NOW , (Feb. 15, 2019), http://blogs.kent
law.iit.edu/iscotus/day-supreme-court-history-february-15-1932-benjamin-cardozo-nominatedsupreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/2AXL-3RG4].
108. See id.
109. See David Montgomery, Conquers of the Courts, WASH . POST MAG ., (Jan. 10, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/magazine/wp/2019/01/02/feature/conquerors-of-thecourts/ [https://perma.cc/6R5U-W5PF]; Charlie Savage, Trump Is Rapidly Reshaping the
Judiciary. Here’s How, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/11/us/
politics/trump-judiciary-appeals-courts-conservatives.html [https://perma.cc/33BS-J9Q5].
110. Russell Wheeler, Senate Obstructionism Handed a Raft of Judicial Vacancies to
Trump—What Has He Done With Them?, BROOKINGS, (June 4, 2018), https://www.brookings.
edu/blog/fixgov/2018/06/04/senate-obstructionism-handed-judicial-vacancies-to-trump/ [https://
perma.cc/VSV2-GF4C].
111. See id.
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That 2015-2016 unprecedentedly meager confirmation record
helps explain the many vacancies Trump inherited and his ability
to fill roughly a fourth of the 179 statutorily created appellate
judgeships.112 In that light, McGahn’s claim that “vacancies aren’t
driven by the President” does not tell the whole story.113 Here, the
vacancies were driven by Republican Senate leadership in hopes
that a Republican would soon occupy the White House. Late-term
confirmation slowdowns are one thing—justified on the basis of the
semifictional “Thurmond rule,” for example—but 2015-2016 was
something else.114 Thus, McGahn’s call for the Senate to “take a step
back from the brink, and not repeat what we have seen over the
past several years and decades” has something of a hollow ring.115
The 2015-2016 Senate’s Merrick Garland 1.0 and 2.0 has ratchetted contentiousness—already supercharged—to a new level. We
may have reached the point that the only way to get a Supreme
Court vacancy filled is to ensure the same political party controls
the White House and the Senate. The same thing for court of
appeals nominees could be on the horizon.
B. Trump’s District Confirmations
As of mid-July 2020, the Senate has confirmed fifty-three (or
ninety-six percent) of Trump’s fifty-five circuit nominees, with
median of 136 days from nomination to confirmation, much faster,
as Table 2 shows than nominees of his recent predecessors.116 As of
the same date, however, it has confirmed only 143 (77 percent) of his
185 district nominees, in median days of 250, longer than confirmations under his immediate predecessors (215 for Obama, 142 for W.
Bush).117 From Inauguration Day to mid-July 2020, circuit vacancies
112. Russell Wheeler, Appellate Court Vacancies May Be Scarce in Coming Years, Limiting
Trump’s Impact, BROOKINGS (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2018/12/06/
trump-impact-on-appellate-courts/ [https://perma.cc/D5L2-TE9G].
113. McGahn, supra note 3, at 107.
114. See Russell Wheeler, The “Thurmond Rule” and Other Advice and Consent Myths,
BROOKINGS: FIXGOV (May 25, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2016/05/25/thethurmond-rule-and-other-advice-and-consent-myths/ [https://perma.cc/RG36-TNH8].
115. McGahn, supra note 3, at 134.
116. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (citing to Table 2).
117. Wheeler, supra note 13. The author’s data sets are drawn from publicly available
sources. See, e.g., Nominations, supra note 1; Biographical Directory of Art III. Federal
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declined from seventeen to none, but district vacancies from eightysix to only seventy-three (and were eighty-six in late 2019).118 Given
the likely paucity of circuit vacancies to fill in 2020, Trump’s district
court confirmation rate will likely increase and the time to confirmation decrease. But these figures, at the end of over three years in
office, speak to the primacy that the Senate and the administration
have given to appointing (conservative) court of appeals judges
while letting vacancies fester in the courts where the vast majority
of federal court litigation starts and ends. From the perspective of
mid-2020 at least, it appears that the Senate became serious about
filling district vacancies only when it had nearly depleted the circuit
vacancies to fill.
IV. ARE THERE WAYS OUT OF “THE MESS?”119
McGahn recounts several process suggestions for easing the
contentiousness or at least speeding up the process but seems skeptical that they would foster improvement. He recalls then-Judge
Brett Kavanaugh’s and others’ suggestion for a time limit on the
Senate to act on a nominee.120 He notes the calls for more prenomination White House-senator consultation, although he says his
efforts to promote such consultation on the Kavanaugh nomination
met resistance from Democratic senators.121 He says the Senate
Judiciary Committee questionnaire that nominees must complete
is “onerous” but might “help[ ] someone somewhere evaluate the
nominee.”122 He hints around the possibility of doing away with
nominee hearings before the Judiciary Committee but does not
endorse it outright.123
In considering process changes, a better place to start is Michael
Shenkman’s 2012 article, which has received less attention than it
Judges, supra note 1; Judicial Vacancies, supra note 1; Party Division, Senate, supra note 1.
118. See Russell Wheeler, Judicial Appointments in Trump’s First Three Years: Myths and
Realities, BROOKINGS: FIXGOV (January 28, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/
2020/01/28/judicial-appointments-in-trumps-first-three-years-myths-and-realities/ [https://
perma.cc/955G-WDXX]; Judicial Vacancies, supra note 1.
119. See McGahn, supra note 3, at 108.
120. Id. at 129.
121. Id. at 129-30.
122. Id. at 130-31.
123. Id. at 131.
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deserves.124 It does not propose to fix highly contentious Supreme
Court and court of appeals processes but instead zeros in on the
confirmation of district judges.125 Although district judges are in
many ways the backbone of the judiciary, reshaping their nomination and confirmation may be easier than reshaping the nomination
and confirmation of court of appeals judges.
Vacancies among district judgeships were numerous when
Shenkman wrote early in the decade,126 and are numerous now at
the end of the decade; there were eighty-six district vacancies in
January 2017 and eighty-eight vacancies in late November 2019.127
District vacancies create problems for litigants, especially civil
litigants, given the statutory priority that judges must give to
criminal cases. District nominees under recent administrations have
waited on median roughly nine months for confirmation.128 This
cannot help but discourage prospective nominees—especially those
in private practice—from having their names submitted.
Shenkman suggests administrations try to increase peer pressure
on senators by:
• publishing the status of negotiations over prospective nominees;129 as noted above, although the Senate has killed homestate senators’ blue-slip prerogatives for court of appeals
nominees, it appears that the Senate continues to negotiate
with senators, of both parties, regarding nominees for district
court vacancies.
• streamlining the Judiciary Committee questionnaire for
district judges by eliminating some of the requirements for
information; for example, Shenkman suggests that administrations could eliminate questions about “long lists of court
124. Michael L. Shenkman, Decoupling District from Circuit Judge Nominations: A
Proposal to Put Trial Bench Confirmations on Track, 65 ARK . L. REV. 217 (2012).
125. See, e.g., Shenkman, supra note 124.
126. Id. at 230.
127. See Vacancy Summary for January 2017, U.S. CTS. (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.us
courts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2017/01/summary
[https://perma.cc/W7DB-7RMG]; Vacancy Summary for November 2019, U.S. CTS. (Nov. 1,
2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-vacan
cies/2019/11/summary [https://perma.cc/YG3K-P4ME].
128. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (citing to Table 1); supra note 44 and
accompanying text (citing to Table 2).
129. See Shenkman, supra note 124, at 299.
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admissions” and activities many years back, such as some
college newspaper articles, the inadvertent omission of which
can prompt a charge of hiding things.130
• largely eliminating hearings for district judges, which are
mostly pro forma affairs; Shenkman notes that hearings for
circuit nominees “can be an opportunity to focus public attention on ideological issues. District judges are not of the same
type ... [and] [t]he rationale of ideological evaluation is inappropriate to the jobs for which they are headed.”131 and
• finding various ways to expedite floor consideration for district
nominees,132 who, even under Trump, have not faced the same
floor opposition as circuit nominees.133
Although these recommendations are reasonable, one cannot hold
out much hope that they will get the attention they deserve, much
less any action. Formal changes to the courts and the processes
surrounding them rarely get effected absent crises, and, like the frog
in a pot of water who is unaware that it is now boiling, few are
willing to take concrete steps to improve the condition of the nomination and conformation process.
V. THE BIGGER PICTURE: POLARIZATION AND ITS JUDICIAL BRANCH
RAMIFICATIONS
One reason that proposed changes to the confirmation process
seem futile is that the contention and delay are less a function of
rules than a manifestation of the polarization that gridlocks much
of American politics.134 “Polarization ... limit[s] the national government’s ability to deal with big problems and even to perform
once-routine tasks, like funding the government without games of
130. Id. at 304-05.
131. Id. at 306-07.
132. Id. at 308-09.
133. While two thirds of Trump circuit nominees received forty or more no votes, only a
fifth of his district nominees did so. Compare Wheeler, Trump Dist. Nominees, supra note 44,
with Wheeler, Trump CA Nominees, supra note 44. The author’s data sets are drawn from
publicly available sources. See, e.g., Nominations, supra note 1; Biographical Directory of Art
III. Federal Judges, supra note 1; Judicial Vacancies, supra note 1; Party Division, Senate,
supra note 1.
134. For the most recent recounting, see generally EZRA KLEIN , WHY WE’RE POLARIZED
(2020).
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budgetary chicken.”135 Polarization has, not surprisingly, corrupted
the once near-ministerial task of filling district and circuit vacancies.136 Opposition party senators (Democrats and Republicans)
are less likely to acknowledge a president’s prerogative to appoint
judges who meet basic tests of acceptability, acknowledgements that
in earlier times encouraged reciprocal behavior from the other party
as it contemplated someday regaining control of the White House.137
Nor is either party likely to ratchet back the contentiousness with
a magnanimous “let-bygones-be-bygones” effort to wipe the slate
clean.
Polarization has had another effect on the federal judiciary.
Polarization has thrived in part because of a dearth of democracy.
Our federal republic, to state the obvious, was designed to frustrate
pure democracy, partly through the so-called checks-and-balances
but also through a federalism that gives disproportionate power to
the states as political units—in the Senate and the electoral
college.138 That disproportion has grown considerably. In 1790, the
population of the largest state was thirteen times that of the
smallest; today it is seventy times,139 giving some voters an outsized
say in national policy determinations.
This “GOP[ ] geographic advantage”140 bears on the federal judiciary because of a fact cited by observers as diverse as the late
Chief Justice William Rehnquist and the late Yale political scientist,
Professor Robert Dahl, a leading democratic theorist.141 Dahl’s
135. Russell Wheeler, Selecting Federal Judges in an Era of Political Polarization, 42
HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 1 (2016).
136. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, Partisanship, Norms, and Federal Judicial
Appointments, 16 GEO . J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 521, 525 (2018).
137. See generally id.
138. See, e.g., Hans Noel, The Senate Represents States, Not People. That’s the Problem., VOX (Oct. 13, 2018 11:34 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/10/13/17971340/the-senate-rep
resents-states-not-people-constitution-kavanaugh-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/KE3AQTPC].
139. In 1790, Virginia’s population was 747,610 and Delaware’s population was 59,094,
compared to present day California’s population of 39,747,267 and present-day Wyoming’s
population of 572,381. Compare Thomas Jefferson, Schedule of the Whole Number of Persons
Within the Several Districts of the United States, 3 (1790), https://www2.census.gov/library/
publications/decennial/1790/number_of_persons/1790a-02.pdf?# [https://perma.cc/FA5U48GE], with WORLD POPULATION REVIEW , http://worldpopulationreview.com/states/ [https://
perma.cc/W4NZ-NRBJ].
140. KLEIN , supra note 134, at 242.
141. See Russell Wheeler, Pack the Court: Putting a Popular Imprint on the Judiciary,
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classic 1957 article, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme
Court as a National Policy-Maker, argued that popular will was
expressed indirectly in the elections that select the presidents and
senators who seat federal judges.142 That made it “unrealistic to
suppose that the Court would, for more than a few years at most,
stand against any major alternatives sought by a lawmaking
majority.”143 In 1996, Chief Justice Rehnquist told a law school
audience that despite the failure of Franklin Roosevelt’s courtpacking plan, FDR achieved a New Deal-friendly nine-justice Court
through filling vacancies that occurred in the regular order.144
“[T]here is,” Rehnquist said, “a wrong way and a right way to go
about putting a popular imprint on the federal judiciary.”145 His
“right way”: popularly elected presidents and senators reshaping the
judiciary by the normal process of filling vacant judgeships.146
Today, four of the Supreme Court’s five normally conservative
justices were appointed by presidents who gained office despite
losing the popular vote.147 President George W. Bush appointed
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito early in his second term,
which he won with a narrow majority of votes;148 but a necessary
prelude to that second term was his first term, secured with an
Electoral College victory despite a very narrow popular vote loss.149
And President Trump, who lost the popular vote by nearly three
million, has (so far) filled two vacancies.150

BROOKINGS (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2019/04/03/pack-the-courtputting-a-popular-imprint-on-the-federal-judiciary/ [https://perma.cc/8YJ5-QRBF].
142. See id.
143. See id. (quoting Robert Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court
as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957)).
144. See Symposium, The Future of the Federal Courts, 46 AM . U. L. REV. 263 at 273 (1996).
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. See Emily Bazelon, How Will Trump’s Supreme Court Remake America?, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/27/magazine/how-will-trumps-supremecourt-remake-america.html [https://perma.cc/YFK3-F8DS]; David Smith, How Trump Could
Lose the Popular Vote Again-and Hold the White House, GUARDIAN (Sept. 22, 2019), https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/sep/22/donald-trump-popular-vote-electoral-college-2020
[https://perma.cc/ZG44-VG8C].
148. See Smith, supra note 147; Supreme Court Nominations, Present-1789, supra note 14.
149. See Smith, supra note 147.
150. See Smith, supra note 147; Supreme Court Nominations, Present-1789, supra note 14.
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Furthermore, until the 1960s, the Senate confirmed most
Supreme Court nominees by voice vote.151 And almost all recorded
votes before and after the 1960s had sufficient aye votes to leave
little doubt that the senators supporting the nomination represented a majority of the population.152 The senators who voted to
confirm Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, however, represented less than 50 percent of the population.153
In normal times at least one of those seats would have been filled
by Obama, a popular-vote majority president (who saw the Senate
refuse to consider his March 2016 nominee, Merrick Garland).154
Consider, beyond the Supreme Court to the second tier of the
appellate judiciary, that eighty-seven—49 percent—of the circuit
judges in active status as of mid-May 2020 are W. Bush or Trump
appointees.155 I know that many of them are fine people and able
judges but that fact does not override the underlying dynamics at
issue. It would be refreshing if those cheering on the TrumpMcConnell judicial confirmation machine would acknowledge the
lack of much of any popular mandate for the changes that machine
is effecting.
Thus, the question: In 2020, voters may well give a popular and
Electoral College victory to a candidate with at least a slightly leftof-center disposition, along with a Democratic Congress. That
lawmaking majority would likely produce legislation about the
environment, health care, agency regulations, legislative gerrymandering, civil rights and gender matters, and other areas. Will this
Court, as presently constituted or with even a greater Republican
majority, turn back constitutional challenges to that legislation? Or
will its conservative majority—placed in office by presidents who
lost the popular vote and helped by the constitutionally malapportioned Senate—invalidate those laws?
151. See Supreme Court Nominations, present-1789, supra note 14.
152. See id.
153. See Wheeler, supra note 141.
154. See Ron Elving, What Happened with Merrick Garland in 2016 and Why It Matters
Now, NPR (June 29, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/29/624467256/whathappened-with-merrick-garland-in-2016-and-why-it-matters-now [https://perma.cc/BR4KXQDY].
155. See Wheeler, supra note 13. The author’s data sets are drawn from publicly available
sources. See, e.g., Nominations, supra note 1; Biographical Directory of Art III. Federal
Judges, supra note 1; Judicial Vacancies, supra note 1; Party Division, Senate, supra note 1.
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If the latter, the Court may resemble the Court of Roosevelt’s first
term and thus provoke another challenge to the Court’s legitimacy,
unless judicial statesmanship can modulate the jurisprudential
tendencies of the conservative majority. In 1937, Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes defended the Court against FDR’s charges
that it was behind in its work and thus needed more members.156
That same year, in several key cases, he and Justice Owen Roberts
signaled—even before Roosevelt’s first appointee—an end to the
slim Court majority that had resisted state and national economic
regulatory legislation.
CONCLUSION
Obviously, McGahn’s article and this commentary on it are mere
drops in a bucket overflowing with charges, defenses, boasts,
statistical food fights, and some dispassionate analysis of the
current way our politics fills federal judicial vacancies. Whether
any of that cacophony will make the process “better”—however
defined—is doubtful because what McGahn calls the “mess” is
rooted in tectonic changes in United States politics.

156. See JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT
(2010).
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